2009): “Analysis and Design of Selection Committees: A Game Theoretic Secretary Problem

Firms often delegate important decisions to committees which are set up speci cally for that purpose; for example selection committees. We ana-lyze the equilibrium behavior of a game in which committee members (the players) interview candidates sequentially, either hiring or going on to the next one. The players have di¤ering evalutions of candidates (e.g. one cares about typing skills; the other about IT skills), which become their utilities if the candidate is hired. We then consider the optimal design (rules of the game) of such a committee, from the point of view of the \u85rm. That is, which rules hire candidates which maximize the \u85rms utility. Our committee game has a \u85rst round in which the members sequentially, by order of player number, say yeaor neato the candidate. If there are su ¢ cient yeasthen she is tentatively hired; otherwise she is rejected. In the former case, members who said nea can veto the candidate in the second round. Thus the candidate is either hired, rejected, or vetoed. In the last case, the member casting a veto has one less to use on later candidates